The paper addresses the issue of manufacturer's optimal production policy under stochastic demand in an emission 'cap and trade' system, in which emission permit becomes another essential factor for production. Three typical sources of emission permits are considered, including emission quota allocated by the government, permits purchased via emission trading, and emission savings via purification. The emission-dependent manufacturer will balance a tradeoff to enable effective production and to determine an appropriate production scale to maximise expected profit. With these considerations in mind, two different cases of single-and multi-time purification are investigated respectively, and the optimal emissiondependent production models are proposed. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the optimal policy are guaranteed, and several valuable managerial insights are further concluded.
Introduction
In company with the advance of industrial modernisation, massive increase in harmful emissions leads to higher probability of natural disasters and human diseases. As a typical example, carbon (CO 2 ) emission is proved to be the principal cause of global warming. In light of harmfulness of emission, many governments begin to take note of the importance and urgency of emission reduction. In 1992, Earth Summit held in Brazil adopted United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is the first international covenant on controlling emission of greenhouse gas such as carbon dioxide. It provides a basic cooperation framework for international community to cope with the problem of global climate change. However, the development of economy especially industrial economy is highly correlated to the consumption of energy, and there is remarkable diversity in emission reduction cost among countries. In order to balance the interests of all countries, Kyoto Protocol (abbr. Kyoto), as a protocol to the UNFCCC that establishes legally binding commitments for the emission reduction, was initially adopted for use on 1997 in Kyoto, Japan and entered into force on 16 February 2005. Kyoto is a 'cap and trade' system that imposes national caps (i.e., upper limits of net emission) on the emissions of Annex I (industrialised) economies, and proposes 'flexible mechanisms' such as emissions trading (ET), clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) to allow these economies to meet their emission limitations by purchasing emission permits from elsewhere, through financial exchanges, projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I economies, or from Annex I countries with excess allowances (Oberthür and Ott, 1999) . Therefore, international ET is widely seen as an indispensable policy pillar of climate change mitigation and is expected to constitute a key building block of future international climate policy (Stern, 2007) .
Although these caps are national-level commitments, in practice most economies will devolve their emissions targets to individual industrial entities, especially to so-called emission-dependent firms in this paper, such as an energy enterprise, power plant, chemical plant or paper factory. The governments constitute emission trading policy and impose emission quotas to domestic firms. Air Pollution Control (amendment) Bill 2008 introduced by Hong Kong Environmental Protection Department, for example, was submitted to Hong Kong Legislative Council for deliberation in February 2008 and passed as an ordinance in July 2008 (HKLC, 2008) . This ordinance makes an emission reduction plan for local power industry, and states that emission trading will be facilitated. It is certain that emission will be restricted more and more strictly in the future, which will significantly impact the emission-dependent firms on production-related decision-makings.
The main idea of emission trading is to establish cap-and-trade systems which set a binding, absolute cap on total emissions, but allow for certificates -corresponding to the right to emit a specific volume of emissions -to be traded among the covered entities, either nations or companies [Flachsland et al., (2008), p.2] . It means that emission permits can be seen as a kind of necessary asset for production. Emission-dependent firms should be self-regulated according to the allocated quotas. Those who need more emission have to purchase emission permits from other firms or green organisations through emission trading, otherwise, they will be subject to legal sanction. However, those who achieve emission permits saving by improving production or purification technology may earn extra revenue via emission permits trading market. Comparing with the inflexible reward-penalty system of government, such mechanism will be more feasible and efficient, implementation is made easier, and significant saving in public resources can be achieved. Additionally, it can inject vitality to environmental protection in consideration that the Green Organizations have opportunity to be producers of emission permits and earn profits by selling their 'product'. Therefore, they need not solely depend on the financial support from government.
Many literatures are mainly about macro-aspects of emission rights and trading and leave much room to investigate the decision-making of single enterprise. We explore the manufacturer's decision-making with single-time purification and with multi-time purification. Without loss of generalisation, a typical system with one single manufacturer and one single emission is focused to investigate optimal production problem. Single period is considered, that is, the emission quota of each period cannot be transferred from one period to another, at the end of each period, the manufacturer either has to purchase its excessive emission beyond the quota, or sells its surplus emission at a given trading price. Emission quota allocated for a period is assumed to be constant.
Literature review
Incorporating emission permits and trading into production-related issues has been a rich research area. As an example, Sartzetakis (1997) examined the effect that positioning strategies in permits markets have on the degree of competition in the product market as well as on social welfare based on the concept of 'raising rivals' cost strategies'. They investigated an oligopolistic industry whose emissions are controlled under a tradable emission permits regulation, and concluded that the emission permits markets can be used as vehicles to lessen competition in the product market. Becker et al. (1993) believed that efficiency may not be realised if the firm's response to decentralised economic incentives for pollution abatement is affected by the indivisible property of the technology. They propose an incentive scheme which incorporates a penalty on pollution-induced damages to partially remedy this problem. Stavins (1995) stated that transaction costs may be significant in emission permits trading and thus reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs.
By far, most theoretical or empirical researches have focused on macro aspect of emission permits. The effects of emission taxation or trading schemes are investigated in some papers. Carlsson (2000) addressed the issue of optimal environmental taxation under imperfect competition, with the Cournot and Stackelberg settings discussed respectively. Moreover, the role of strategic behaviour was explicitly analysed, and then they concluded that the choice of the strategic variable affects both marginal cost and emissions. David (2005) introduced a new form of policy called voluntary agreements (VA) to regulate a polluting oligopoly since the policy of emission tax has some limits. Kuik and Mulder (2004) assessed three alternative ET schemes at domestic level, including absolute cap-and-trade, relative cap-and-trade and mixed schemes which combine elements of the previous two alternatives.
Some literatures study bilateral trade in emission permits among economic entities. For instance, Rehdanz and Tol (2005) proposed a two-country model to coordinate domestic markets for tradable emission permits where countries determine their own emission reduction. One price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount, quota) to prevent the exporting country from issuing more permits are considered. Klevas et al. (2007) gave a detailed overview of the present policies and measures implemented in the Baltic States to support the use of renewable energy sources (RES) and the increase of energy efficiency. Benjamin (2009) investigated the municipal waste management policy in Europe and explained how the treadmill of production undermines sustainability goals. It is shown that the successful implementation of waste-reduction strategies is hindered by powerful structural forces because there is a direct link between economic activity and waste generation. Jaffe et al. (1995) disclosed the relationship between environmental protection and international competitiveness. The evidence was reviewed to show that international differences in environmental regulatory stringency pose insufficient threats to US industrial competitiveness to justify substantial cutbacks in domestic environmental regulations. Therefore, environmental priorities and goals should be established based on careful balancing of benefits and costs. Godby et al. (1997) conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the contribution of bankable coupons and tradable shares to the efficiency and stability of emission trading markets. Wey and Yang (2005) attempted to discover the effect of emission trading and JI policies on total abatement cost, and show that emission trading policy is the most cost-effective approach for reducing emissions. Xepapadeas and Zeeuw (1999) developed a model to confirm the criticism to the suggestion of the Porter hypothesis driven by the idea that if opportunities exist, firms do not have to be triggered by an extra cost. Downsising and modernisation of firms subject to environmental policy will increase average productivity and will have positive effects on the marginal decrease of profits and environmental damage. Auction can be brought into emission permits trading. Cramton and Kerr (2002) proposed a tax-cut auction for carbon permits, which allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents. Such auction was thought as the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. Lozano and Gutierrez (2010) presented a non-parametric efficiency analysis approach for determining greenhouse gases (GHG) tradable emissions allowances for all countries.
To be brief, the aforementioned literatures concerning emission permits and/or trading suggest that: many theoretical and empirical researches have focused almost on macro-aspects of emission permits and trading, including effects of the emission tax and emission trading schemes, bilateral trade in emission permits among economic entities, how to develop game and set up unilateral policy for economic entities, how emission trade and abatement policy affect involved entities and industries, etc. However, little attention was given to micro-aspects of emission trading. Bode (2004) is the typical one who considered different allocation options in multi-period emission trading in electricity sector. Much fewer papers, until now, treat the impacts of emission permits and trading to decision-making of individual emission-dependent firms. In the context that emission permit becomes a kind of asset and production factor, it can affect firms in many ways especially to their production decision. Therefore, firm-level emission permits and trading is an interesting issue and fairly worth discussing. This paper focuses on the impact of emission trading and purification treatment on production optimisation for an emission-dependent manufacturer in a 'cap and trade' system. The manufacturer can obtain emission permits in three different ways, including emission quota allocated by the government, permits purchased via emission trading, and emissions savings via purification, and will make a tradeoff among them.
In the paper we hold cognitions as follows: Firstly, emission-dependent production is popular among modern firms, including not only some large-scale monopoly manufacturers such as petroleum and chemical, but also other firms, e.g., printing plant and paper mill and so on. Secondly, we believe that the manufacturers will not update its purification facilities to improve the purification rate in a short term because of the high cost. Instead, they may be prone to obtain extra emission savings through increasing the number of purification. Therefore, we also consider the number of purification as a decision variable and try to find the optimal based on the premise that the unit purification cost for each time is constant. Apparently, the more times the emissions are purified, the more emissions savings will be got. At the same time, however, the purification cost is increasing correspondingly. Under this context, the firm has motivation to balance a tradeoff between the spot market price and the purification cost to obtain unit emission permit, and then makes decisions.
Problem characteristic, notations and assumptions
The relationship between production and emission in an emission-dependent firm can be illustrated by Figure 1 . As mentioned above, single period and single type of emissions are considered in this paper, for simplification without loss of generality.
1 It is important for a manufacturer to consider the quantity of its products before selling season, because if more products than the demand of market x are produced, inventory cost occurs; otherwise, the manufacturer has to assume the shortage cost, including opportunity cost and goodwill penalty. Therefore, the manufacturer has to decide the total production according to market demand of product which is assumed to be stochastic and follows a distribution with probability density function (p.d.f.)
2 It is clear that emission is directly proportional to production in a certain technical condition, i.e., the more the manufacturer produces, the more emission will be emitted. Here, e units of emissions per unit product are assumed, and thus the total emissions for q units products must be ( ) . = M q eq The purification rate, α means emission savings by purifying unit emission for single time, α ∈ [0, 1). It can be considered determinate once the purification facilities are installed.
3 The manufacturer can obtain emission permits in three typical ways (as shown in Figure 1 ), i.e., government quota allocated by government at the beginning of a period, ; 
Analytical model
Considering emission-related costs such as emission procurement cost and purification cost, as well as shortage cost and inventory cost, the manufacturer's net profit can be given by
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and rearranging, the manufacturer's net profit can be rewritten as 
Under the general assumption that the demand for the final products is realised stochastically and follows a distribution with p.d.f.
Let us analyse the other two controllable sources of emission permits except government quota. As mentioned above, if the manufacturer purifies unit emission in the purification rate α, the cost of p c occurs and α units of emission savings can be obtained. That is, the cost per unit emission saving must be .
Moreover, the manufacturer has another option, i.e., to purchase unit emission permit from trading market at the cost of . m c In consideration of cost-efficiency, the manufacturer will balance a tradeoff and make the optimal production decision.
Decision-making with single-time purification
In this section, the case of single-time purification is discussed first. The manufacturer will choose a cost-efficient way of getting necessary emission permits between purification and purchase. Three different scenarios should be discussed as follows. π α
The managerial implication is clear. With higher price of emission permits in the trading market (i.e., positive profit margin), the way of purification is preferred. The manufacturer will purify emission to obtain emission savings as more as possible. If the on-hand emission permits are insufficient to satisfy the target production, extra permits will be purchased via emission trading. Otherwise, the surplus can be used to earn extra revenue via emission trading. Therefore, equation (4) should be restated as follows.
[ ] 
where the production quantity q is the decision variable. Accordingly, the first and
Since the second-order condition (7) guarantees the concavity of [ ], π E equation (6) yields the unique optimal production quantity as follows.
( )
Therefore, the purified quantity of emission as well as the resulted emission savings must be * = 
In such settings, the maximal expected profit [ ] ( ) into equation (4) will result in the same expected profit function as equation (10), and therefore the optimal production quantity of the manufacturer can be derived identically as Scenario 2, i.e., equation (12) still holds. Accordingly, the purchased permits via emission trading m λ can be further derived as follows. More concisely, the optimal production quantity in the above scenarios can be uniformly given by For intuitionistic comparison, the optimal decisions made by the manufacturer in the above scenarios are tabulated in Table 1 .
Decision-making with multi-time purification
In most cases, the purification rate α can be considered determinate in a short term once the purification facilities are installed in consideration of high upgrading cost. Nevertheless, repeated purification is allowed. With a certain purification facilities, the more times the emission is purified, the more emission savings will be obtained. However, for each more time of purification, the net increment tends to decrease, while purification cost per unit emission per single time p c still holds. The manufacturer has to balance the increment of emission savings and the corresponding purification cost. Accordingly, the purification times become another decision variable. To facilitate the derivation, , 
Therefore, the total emission savings through purifying p λ units of emission in the purification rate α for n times can be given by
Thus, equation (2) should be restated to formulate the purchased permits via emission trading as follows.
Since p λ units of emission are purified for n times in the purification rate α, the total purification cost will be . (3) is just a special case of equation (19) with respect to single-time purification. Therefore, the expected profit for multi-time purification can be easily obtained by making similar substitution into equation (4) 
where the production quantity q as well as the purification times n should be optimised. We can analyse the purification times first. For simplicity, let
V y c yc y R Since p λ is non-negative and the purification times n is only involved in the last term of equation (20), the purification times n should be decided to make ( ) ( ) { } * argmax ,
Proposition 2 is obvious in consideration that n is a non-negative integer. By far, the optimal purification times * n to maximise in respect of q is conclusive for negative second-order derivative. Therefore, the unique optimal production quantity must be
Therefore, the purified quantity of emission as well as the resulted emission savings must be * = (18) can maximise manufacturer's profit. In this case, the manufacturer has the same expected profit function as that of the 2nd scenario in Section 4.1, i.e., equation (10). Therefore, the derivation can be abbreviated by directly inheriting the optimal production quantity as follows.
The purified quantity of emission p λ and the purchased permits via emission trading m λ satisfy the following relationship.
where
By comparing the expected profits between single-and multi-time purification, we arrive at the following proposition. 
Numerical example and sensitivity analysis
In this section we present a typical numerical analysis to corroborate and supplement the previous developments. Without loss of generalisation, the demand of market x is assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution. Definitely, let ( )
x is assumed normally distributed with mean of 150 and standard deviation of 10, i.e., is tiny enough to be neglected, and the probability density of x is fairly close to that of .
x Therefore, x can be used to approximate x for convenience of calculation.
Besides The emission per unit production is 1.5.
The manufacturer has established purification facility with purification rate α = 0.3 and purification cost per unit per single time
In such settings, the cost-efficiency between purification and purchase should be balanced first whether or not multi-time purification is allowed. If not allowed, the manufacturer will purify as more as possible since . c c recalling Equation (22) and Proposition 2, we have * 4, = n that is, the manufacturer will purify all emission from production for 4 times. In this case, the optimal production quantity should be * 154. Tables 2-5 ). Several insights can be concluded as follows:
1 More advanced technology or facilities of purification will result in larger purification rate per single time. With increase of purification rate, the optimal purification times will increase first and then decrease gradually, which can also be concluded from equations (22) and (24). In the meanwhile, the optimal production quantity as well as the purified emission increases. In effect, the permits purchased/sold via emission trading are always decreasing/increasing. And accordingly, the resulted expected profit increases remarkably.
2 When the trading price of emission permits is low enough, purchase is more cost-efficient than purification, and therefore purification is abandoned. As the price further increases, purchase becomes less and less economical. Emission permit, as a kind of necessary input, seems more and more valuable. In this case, the manufacturer must lessen the optimal production quantity * q to maximise the expected profit, therefore the purified emissions * p λ decreases once purification is implemented. Besides, the optimal purification times * n tends to increase, which leads to a general trend of increase in the obtained emission savings * p λ nevertheless there is still a tiny downward fluctuation if no change happens to * q Now that the production quantity decreases while the emission savings tend to increase, the permits purchased/sold via emission trading * m λ decrease/increase gradually. As a result, the expected profit decreases first and then increases.
3 In contrast, the influence of emissions per unit product on the optimal results seems rather simpler. The optimal purification times * q does not change with increase of .
e However, the optimal production quantity * q and the maximal expected profit are negatively correlated, while the purified emissions Table 4. 4 With increase of purification cost per unit per single time, purification becomes less and less economical in contrast to emission trading. Accordingly, the optimal purification times * n the purified emission remarkably. The optimal production quantity * q is slightly reduced to maximise the expected profit. In general, the maximal expected profit is negatively correlated to . Table 4 Sensitivity of optimal results to emissions per unit product 
Concluding remarks and future research
The present paper investigates the impact of emission trading and purification treatment on production optimisation in a 'cap and trade' system. A typical emission-dependent manufacturer is concerned. In this case, emission permit becomes a new kind of productive element rather than a rigid resource constraint, because it can be obtained through several ways. Three sources of emission permits is considered, including emission quota allocated by the government, permits purchased via emission trading, and emission savings via purification. Therefore, how to balance a tradeoff between purchase and purification, to enable effective production and to decide an appropriate production scale to maximise profit, becomes a problem which worth in-depth discussion. Since emission permits are tradable, either its deficiency or sufficiency due to large or small production scale can be solved through emission trading. In this paper, the demand of final product is assumed to be stochastically distributed. Two different cases of single-and multi-time purification are detailed discussed respectively. In each case, several scenarios with respect to the cost-efficiency between purification and purchase are analysed, and the optimal production quantity, purified emission, obtained emission savings, permits via emission trading (purchase or sell) and the resulted maximal expected profit are derived respectively. If multi-time purification is allowed, the purification times becomes another decision variable, therefore its optimisation is further explored. The existence and uniqueness of all the above optimum are guaranteed. Furthermore, our analytical models yield several valuable managerial insights and implications.
As all other papers, however this paper has some flaws. Firstly, we merely consider a simple system -single manufacturer and single emission, but it can be generalised to multiple manufacturers and multiple emissions easily; secondly, we assume the demand of final product is normally distributed in the section of numerical example and sensitivity analysis, however, it may be subject to other distribution in reality, this problem can be solved by manufacturer to find the regularity through statistical analysis and data mining, each company or product has its own demand distribution. Thirdly, the data is not real when we make sensitivity analysis, but we show how the main factors influence the results of optimisation and thus we know variation trend of relative variables from our analysis which contribute a lot to manufacturer's production optimisation.
This paper goes a further step to bring the emission permits and trade to firm level to study its influences, however, it still leave much room to research, such as considering a system including multiple periods, multiple manufacturers or multiple emissions. When bring multiple periods into this model which means the manufacturer is allowed to transfer surplus emission right of this period to next period, the manufacturer will have motivation to use emission permits as little as possible, otherwise, he may run out of all the emission permits even through he has extra parts, because he has no reason to save it. We can also investigate the optimal price of emission permit and introduce game theory to coordinate the firms who have emission permits to sell in the market and so on.
